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Article
THE CASE AGAINST PROPERTY RIGHTS IN OLD
INTANGIBLE INDIGENOUS CULTURAL
PROPERTY
Dennis S. Karjala∗
Robert K. Paterson∗∗
NOTE—This article expands on a chapter to be published as “The Failed
Case for Property Rights in Intangible Indigenous Cultural Property”, in
Christoph Antons and William Logan (eds.) Intellectual Property, Cultural
Property and Intangible Cultural Heritage (Routledge, forthcoming, 2017).
ABSTRACT—This article critically reviews some of the recent literature
calling for intellectual property rights in indigenous cultural knowledge. In
an earlier piece, we argued generally against the notion of defining a new
class of “indigenous cultural property” analogous to copyright and patent
rights. Rather, we must analyze demands for more protection for old
cultural property by building from the ground up, using judicial
interpretation or carefully tailored statutory amendments to determine
whether the work in question is one that should be protected by a new right
and, if so, deciding both the scope and term of protection. Intellectual
property involves a tradeoff between rewarding the legitimate demands for
protection and society’s overall interest in allowing information generally
to be used freely. Hence the term of protection for both patent and
∗
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copyright has always been limited. Here we review some of the
commentary that has appeared in the interim seeking to establish rights in
old cultural property. We conclude that many of the assumptions
underlying calls for such protection cannot withstand critical analysis and
that a one-size-fits-all definition of indigenous cultural property is both
unwise to try and impossible to achieve.
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 2
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INTRODUCTION
In an earlier work, we argued that resolving the problem of protecting
intangible indigenous cultural heritage should not take the form of defining
a new class of “indigenous cultural property” that would be subject to
rights under, or analogous to, those recognized by the intellectual property
regimes of patent and copyright. We concluded, rather, that a “one size fits
all” approach was incapable of balancing the tensions between
understandable demands from indigenous peoples to have control over their
cultural heritage, on the one hand, and fundamental policy values reflected
in the intellectual property regimes and in basic notions of free expression,
on the other. We outlined a number of specific situations in which careful
judicial interpretation of existing laws or modest amendments to existing
statutory regimes can meet many of the needs and demands of indigenous
peoples. In many cases, there is no fundamental clash between western
legal traditions and the legitimate demands for privacy, confidentiality, or
recognition that indigenous claimants might make. In some cases, however,
especially those involving outsider use of publicly available but “old”
indigenous works (that is, those works no longer protected by copyright),
attempting to give control to the group is fundamentally antithetical to
1
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See generally Robert K Paterson & Dennis S. Karjala, Looking Beyond Intellectual Property in
Resolving Protection of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 633 (2003).
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basic notions of free expression and the overall development and
dissemination of culture.2 For such cases, a value judgment must be made.
We concluded that a regime of perpetual rights in the indigenous group
from which the work derived is both practically impossible and
theoretically unsound: “[I]ndigenous cultural tradition must give way to the
modern creative spirit.”3
Since our article appeared, there has been a good deal of activity, both
at the United Nations and in various countries.4 In addition, the
commentators have been active.5 Most approaches, however, continue
down the path of asserting that western legal concepts are “inappropriate”
to meet the needs of indigenous peoples and therefore must be modified in
one way or another. An implicit assumption in many of these commentaries
is that “indigenous peoples” do, in fact, have some common needs or
demands that are in conflict with “western” traditions. They also seem to
assume that all members within a particular indigenous culture have the
same goals with respect to the use, by insiders or outsiders, of the group’s
intangible heritage. To the extent a given proposal does rely on inter- or
intra-group homogeneity, we are skeptical that it can provide a meaningful
general resolution. Some groups might find, for example, that the
commodification of their music or certain artistic images is offensive on
religious grounds. Others might find the same use offensive simply because
it is, in their opinion, in bad taste. Others might not object to the
commodification so much as to their exclusion from the profits derived
from it.6
Another problem that remains extant in the literature is the general
assumption that “indigenous cultural property” can be defined in a
meaningful way and that the individuals or groups who are to be given a
certain degree of control rights can be identified. There is also an implicit
assumption that these control rights can be appropriately circumscribed to
assure that those in control do, in fact, exercise their power with the goals
and needs of the group in mind.7
2

Id. at 670
Id. at 670.
4
We discuss below developments in New Zealand, Taiwan, and the Pacific Islands. See infra
pp.18–27.
5
The stewardship model in application to intangible property is discussed extensively, see infra
Part A. Other commentary is discussed more briefly, see infra Parts B–D. 6
See Yuqin Jin, Note, Necessity: Enacting Laws to Protect Indigenous Intellectual Property Rights
in the United States, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 950, 955–59 (2011) (reporting disputes
between related tribes over ownership of the knowledge in question and raising the question of who can
legitimately represent indigenous people).
7
See Marilyn Strathern, Multiple Perspectives on Intellectual Property, in PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL, BIOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL PROPERTY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 47, 52 (Kathy Whimp
3
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One of the more important commentaries on these topics attempts to
obviate some of these difficulties by reframing rights in indigenous cultural
property within traditional western property law concepts.8 Professors
Carpenter et al. offer the notion of “stewardship” as a limitation on
ownership rights in cultural property, both tangible and intangible, so that
an “owner” of property might not necessarily be able to use it to the full
extent otherwise allowed but would negotiate with relevant cultural groups
or their representatives over uses that impinge on aspects of the group’s
cultural heritage that the group has an obligation to maintain.
Unfortunately, however, while Professors Carpenter et al. give a number of
examples to show how their stewardship model would work, they actually
pay scant attention to the problem of intangible cultural property
(discussing in detail only the problem of sports mascots). Professors
Carpenter et al. supply no definition of what property is covered, who
exercises the rights of stewardship, or how such rights are to be determined
or delimited (except by way of ad hoc example). We believe that it is
imperative to distinguish carefully between tangible and intangible
property. We do not see how the stewardship model – as a limitation on
property rights – applies even to the main intangible property problem that
they address, which is that of sports mascots. More important, for
traditional designs, music, dance, literature, and other graphic arts, we must
distinguish between a demand for regulation on offensiveness grounds and
a demand for revenue sharing. Not only must we decide who does the
“stewarding” and on what basis, but we must also decide on what basis, if
any, a new design based on an indigenous “style” gives right to a claim.
For plants or even human DNA, what is there to “steward” except a stream
of profits, to a part of which indigenous people are assumed to be entitled?
The failure to distinguish tangible from intangible property in these
situations is, in our minds, fatal to the enterprise insofar as intangible
cultural heritage is concerned.
In this article, we undertake a critical review of some of the
commentary on, as well as actual and proposed legal developments relating
to, indigenous cultural property that have appeared since our earlier
contribution. We remain convinced that a coherent approach to the problem
of intangible cultural property protection must lie in a set of carefully
articulated statements of the problem in specifically delineated cases.

& Mark Busse eds., 2013) (ebook) (“Even if a group can be identified, who belongs to the group? Who
is the representative to speak on its behalf? What about power inequalities between different interests
within the group?”).
8
See generally Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, In Defense of Property,
118 YALE L.J. 1022 (2009) [hereinafter referred to as “Professors Carpenter et al”].
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Reasonable people will disagree about the appropriate resolution in many
of these cases, but it is only through such articulation that resolution is to
be found. Continued search for a one-size-fits-all approach to “intangible
indigenous cultural property,” we believe, amounts to chasing a will-o’-thewisp.
I. THE BASIC PROBLEM OF INTANGIBLE CULTURAL HERITAGE
PROTECTION
It is important to emphasize that we consider here the problem of
control over intangibles–most broadly speaking, information. We are not
dealing with real property, such as geographical locations that are sacred or
otherwise culturally meaningful to one or more indigenous groups. Nor are
we dealing with tangible personal property, such as carvings, rugs, pots,
jewelry, clothing, paintings, and the like. Rather, we address whether and
under what circumstances an indigenous group justifiably may assert
control rights over such intangibles as music, designs, pictures, stories, and
methods of medical treatment.
There are important reasons that we single out information for special
treatment in the discussion of protecting indigenous cultural heritage.
Rights in information–especially property rights in information–are a
relatively new concept in human development. Copying successful
behavior is something humans have done from time immemorial, and
indeed copying successful behaviors has been shown to be a strategy that
can win over a strategy of innovating.9 It is unlikely that the first person to
come up with the idea of attaching rounded stones to some sort of axle felt
entitled to royalties whenever this invention was used to move heavy
boulders to erect ancient monuments and other buildings. The notion of
patents in new technology–property rights in information–seems to be a
product of the Renaissance, when a Venetian statute was adopted to
encourage the building and disclosure of “any new and ingenious device”
by granting a 10-year period of exclusive rights.10 And, of course, until the
invention of the printing press, it was so difficult to copy an extensive work
of literature that no need was seen for anything like copyright. In other
words, over most of human history, the absence of exclusive rights in

9

Elizabeth Pennisi, Conquering by Copying, 329 SCI. 165 (2010) (describing a computer
tournament in which, at each turn, teams could either observe another’s behavior, exploit a known
behavior, or innovate a new behavior); see Dennis S. Karjala, “Copying” and “Piracy” in the Digital
Age, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 245, 247 n.7 (2013). Recent observations among nonhuman primates has also
shown the development and dissemination of “culture” by observation and copying.
10
Craig Allen Nard, THE LAW OF PATENTS 9–11 (3d ed. 2014).
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information was the default position–almost certainly in every geographical
region and in every culture.
And there is a good and easily understandable reason for
distinguishing information from tangible articles: information is nonrival.
Exclusive property rights in tangibles are arguably more conducive to
economic efficiency because they help avoid “overgrazing” and the tragedy
of the commons.11 Although most will tire of hearing the same song over
and over again, information cannot be overgrazed in the depletion sense,
and the creator of a song remains just as free to sing or perform it after
another learns it as before. Consequently, exclusive rights in information
are not necessary to prevent the information from being used up too rapidly
or inefficiently.12 If we are to recognize exclusive rights in information, we
need reasons that do not rely on scarcity, which distinguishes information
from most of the resource allocation and distribution problems that
economists typically consider.
While no one seriously disputes these premises, the legal community
has seen ongoing debate over the reasons that we do, in fact, recognize
intellectual property rights (IPRs). The reasons are important because they
determine not only whether information of a particular type is protected at
all but also the scope of any protection that is afforded, including the term
of such protection. We protect trade secrets in the interest of stimulating
economic efficiency by allowing the relatively free flow of information
within a firm and in the interest of preventing economic waste that would
otherwise go into self-help protection measures. Consistent with these
purposes, trade secret protection lapses when the secret becomes known
outside the firm, whether by authorized or unauthorized disclosure from
within or by independent discovery.13 Similarly, traditional trademark law
protects against the unauthorized use of a mark to “pass off” goods or
services as those of the mark owner, but only if there is a likelihood of
confusion by the consuming public. This allows mark owners to invest in
11

E.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 351–52
(1967); Peter S. Menell, Governance of Intellectual Resources and Disintegration of Intellectual
Property in the Digital Age, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1523, 1533-34 (2011).
12
Professor Landes and Judge Posner have argued that perpetual copyright may be useful in
protecting great works of art, literature, and music from becoming debased through over performance
and display. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 471, 485–88 (2003). Their theory, however, does not stand up to scrutiny. Dennis S. Karjala,
Congestion Externalities and Extended Copyright Protection, 94 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1076–85 (2006).
13
Because of this limitation, it is difficult to classify trade secret information as “property.” Trade
secret law simply protects against acquisition of the information by unlawful means, but it gives no
exclusive right in the information as such. See Lynn Sharp Paine, Trade Secrets and the Justification of
Intellectual Property: A Comment on Hettinger, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 247, 257 (1991) (concluding that
the concept of property is not necessary to justify the rights of trade secret).
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building their reputations with good quality products and services and
assists consumers in rapidly finding products and services in whose quality
they have confidence. While the term of trademark protection is indefinite
(and therefore potentially infinite), the very narrow scope of protection
severely limits trademark’s encroachment into the public domain, even if
we include trademark as an “intellectual property” statute.14 In the case of
both trademark and trade secret law, therefore, we know what the
protection goals are and this informs the decision concerning what types of
information to protect, how such protection should be limited and by what
means, and against what actions by third parties protection will be
available.
The patent and copyright regimes are much more general in their
protection of information. Patent law protects new technological advances,
while traditional copyright protects works of authorship–art, literature, and
music. Because an exclusive right to a desirable product permits the
rightowner to charge a price above marginal cost, the exclusive rights of
patent and copyright do inhibit consumption of works embodying the
subject of the right, resulting in a “deadweight” social loss (in the sense
that there are some people who would be willing to pay the marginal cost
of production or even more but not the higher price charged by the
rightowner). We accept these deadweight losses from the patent and
copyright regimes because we fear that a failure to grant such rights to
inventors and authors would result in less public availability of socially
desirable works. In other words, we afford the exclusive rights of patent
and copyright as an incentive to inventors and authors to create new
inventions and works of authorship.15 In affording this incentive, both
regimes attempt to be mindful as well of the problem of cumulative
innovation: first-generation works often serve as inputs for secondgeneration innovations.16 Consequently, the stronger the rights afforded to
the first innovator, the lower the incentive for follow-on creators to build
on the earlier work.

14

See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (“There is no such thing
as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an established business or trade in
connection with which the mark is employed.”); see also Richard A. Epstein, Liberty versus Property?
Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2005) (noting that a
trademark in the public domain is essentially useless to anyone, because it can no longer serve its
signaling function). Admittedly, the recent extension of trademark law to the protection of famous
marks against “dilution” brings trademark closer to a “property” regime.
15
Menell, supra note 11, at 1534–35.
16
Id. at 1535.
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The details of patent and copyright protection depend on the nature of
the information (subject matter) protected.17 In the United States, copyright
arises automatically upon fixation of copyright subject matter – works of
authorship – in a tangible medium. The scope of copyright protection is
defined by the vague idea/expression dichotomy – copyright protects only
the expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves. Copyright infringement is
determined by the equally vague “substantial similarity” standard, and the
term of copyright protection endures for seventy years after the death of the
author. Patents, on the other hand, cover works of technology and issue
only upon formal application and after examination by a skilled examiner
for novelty and nonobviousness. The scope of patent protection is defined
and narrowly limited by the claims, and the term of patent protection is
only 20 years from filing. The reason that these two regimes, which have
similar goals of promoting the general welfare by granting limited-term
exclusive rights in information, are so different in their operational detail
inheres in the respective natures of the information they protect: patent
protects functional works of technology, while traditional copyright
protects nonfunctional works of authorship.18 While many believe that the
current term of copyright protection is too long, nearly all agree that the
patent term must be shorter than that for copyright because so much
technology builds incrementally on what has already been invented and
made available.
The point is that intangible property – information – is given certain
degrees of protection depending on the nature of the information and
overall social goals. The default position is that information is free for
anyone to use as he or she will. With trade secret law, society seeks to
improve economic efficiency with respect to information that, in any event,
would not be made available to the public, by reducing the effort the
possessor of the information must make to keep the information of value.
With trademark law, society cabins off a tiny bit of information so that it
can serve a signaling function for offerors of goods and services and their
customers. With patent and copyright, society seeks to supply an incentive
to create new and desirable works, with the details depending crucially on
whether the information relates to technological function or to the
nonfunctional world of art, literature, and music.19 Thus, any call to protect
17

Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject Matter, 35 CONN. L. REV. 439
(2003).
18
Id. at 448–58.
19
Computer software presents a special case in which functional works are protected under
copyright. One of the current authors has written extensively on this point. See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala,
supra note 17; Dennis S. Karjala, A Coherent Theory for the Copyright Protection of Computer
Software and Recent Judicial Interpretations, 66 U. CINCINNATI L. REV. 53 (1997). This special case
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information that does not fall within traditional information-protection
regimes needs to supply a reason both for protection at all and for the
specific scope and duration of such protection. We do not believe that a
single rationale exists for protection of a broad category of information
under the rubric of “indigenous cultural heritage.” We do believe, however,
that reasons can be given for a degree of protection of specific types of
information that many would classify as “indigenous cultural heritage.” It
is simply a matter of articulating the need for protection in terms beyond “I
would like to have exclusive rights in X.” (We would each like to have
exclusive rights to, say, the works of Shakespeare.) Once the necessity or
desirability case has been made, we can set about limiting both the scope
and duration of protection to meet the articulated need, subject to
countervailing interests of the public for allowing the information to remain
in the public domain.
The basic problem for cultural heritage protection does not, therefore,
lie in the absence of a known single author or group of authors. If a
legitimate basis for protection can be articulated, it is relatively easy to
write statutory language that accomplishes the task.20 Similarly, the
problem does not inhere in the absence of a writing or other fixation of the
work, such as stories handed down by means of oral tradition. While it is
true that the United States does require fixation for the attachment of
federal copyright protection, most countries do not have a fixation
requirement, and even within the United States unfixed works may be
protected, at least against unauthorized publication, by state law.21 The real
problem for intangible cultural heritage protection, as a general matter, is
that it requires us to go beyond patent and copyright, and beyond the
default position that information is in the public domain, to protect
information for an indefinite, potentially infinite, time. We know why
nonprotection is the default position for information, and we know why
that brings technological subject matter under copyright instead of its traditional home in patent law has
no relevance to the cultural property question, except perhaps to show that copyright can, in fact, make
room for special cases when there are reasons to do so.
20
For example, Article 15(4)(a) of the Berne Convention provides that members may designate an
author’s representative to enforce the copyright rights of an unknown author from that country. Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works Art. 15(4)(a) (Paris text 1971),
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=283698#P192_37445 [https://perma.cc/DH2S-MLCP].
A student commentator has advocated the application of state tort law, in the United States, to culturally
based harms resulting from sociological research, recognizing the difficulty of proving group harm but
suggesting arguments that might be accepted. Gerald Carr, Comment, Protecting Intangible Cultural
Resources: Alternatives to Intellectual Property Law, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 363 (2013). Of course,
while we do not necessarily advocate such a statute, a statute narrowly tailored to achieve this end
would be even more effective.
21
See. e.g., Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding
the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119 (1983).
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(more or less) we make limited exceptions to that position for patent and
copyright. If we are to go beyond the boundaries of these two paradigms,
we must know why we are doing so.22
II. SOME CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR CULTURAL HERITAGE PROTECTION
A. The Stewardship Model
A good deal of attention has been directed toward the so-called
“stewardship model” for cultural property proposed by Professors Kristen
A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal and Angela R. Riley.23 This ambitious
proposal argues that many problems of cultural heritage protection can be
analyzed and resolved using the traditional concepts of property law. These
authors correctly observe that title to property, tangible or intangible, has
never given the property owner an absolute right to use, or even to exclude
others from, the property. “Stewardship” is seen as a limitation on an
owner’s rights designed to reconcile the interests of owners and nonowners.
The notion is that indigenous people often have a fiduciary or custodial
duty with respect to certain tangible and intangible properties and that the
cultural survival of a group may depend on its ability to fulfill such duties.24
Consequently, legal ownership rights would be modified or curtailed to
some extent, presumably to the extent needed to permit the indigenous
groups to fulfill their custodial duties.
We have no objection as a general matter to limitations on owners’
rights in tangible or intangible property that are designed to permit the
carrying out of inherited custodial duties, especially if the survival of an
entire culture depends on it. The problem is in the details, few of which
Professors Carpenter et al. supply, especially for intangible property. Their
basic idea stems from the claim that “certain property deserves legal
protection because it is integral to the collective survival and identity of
indigenous groups.”25 This is followed by the claim that “[i]ndigenous
22

Professor Michael Brown has proffered an “ecological approach” to draw an appropriate balance
between the two desirable goals of protecting cultural heritage and promoting free and open expression
throughout society. Michael F. Brown, Heritage Trouble: Recent Work on the Protection of Intangible
Cultural Property, 12 INTERNAT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 40, 51 (2005). He would allow, as would we,
greater protection for sacred information under conditions of confidentiality designed to secure
intangible cultural heritage, provided such schemes do not impinge too greatly on democratic values. Id.
at 52. We assume he would be equally amenable to schemes designed to protect an articulated
indigenous interest, at least if they are narrowly limited to the articulated interest.
23
See Carpenter et al., supra note 8.
24
Id. at 1124–25.
25
Id. at 1046. Except in their specific examples, Professors Carpenter et al. do not supply a
definition of what property is included in the “certain property” they refer to here. Later they vary the
formulation somewhat: “because certain lands, expressions, and products are integral to indigenous
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peoples, rather than holding property rights delineated by notions of title
and ownership, often hold rights, interests, and obligations to preserve
cultural property irrespective of title.”26 The stewardship model would
transfer some of the sticks in the traditional property rights bundle to
nonowners, who would exercise certain rights sometimes in conjunction
with, and sometimes in place of, their exercise by the formal property
owners.27 Importantly, the stewardship model does not predetermine
outcomes in favor of indigenous groups. Rather, the principle mandates
that the interests of indigenous people be taken into consideration “as
raising legal claims that are equal to, and in some unique cases superior to,
those of title-holders.”28 Finally, stewardship itself is divided into “dynamic
and static stewardship,”29 whose “trajectories”30 serve as “prisms”31 for
viewing the role of stewardship in protecting indigenous cultural property.
Static stewardship under the model of Professors Carpenter et al.
involves four interests of indigenous people: Conserving a sacred resource
from overuse or pollution; placing an object, such as funerary remains, to
rest; imposing rules against alienation to preserve the “physical and
spiritual integrity” of an object; and access to and preservation of a cultural
resource, such as a sacred site.32 Static stewardship thus seems to apply
largely, if not wholly, to tangible property. To that extent, it lies outside our
specific concern here with intangible property. Dynamic stewardship,
however, involves at least one of three “rights”: rights of “commodification
that govern the production of downstream cultural properties”; rights
governing the acquisition and use of downstream cultural goods, including
the sharing of information with nonindigenous groups; and more limited
identity and group survival, they may merit expanded and particular legal protection in some cases.” Id.
at 1089. The key word seems to be “integral” to group survival and identity, but a key unanswered
question is, what kinds of works, exactly, are “integral” in this sense? One example these authors do
supply is that of Aboriginal complaints in Australia to some pictures of a kangaroo and emu on various
items of state property. Notwithstanding Aboriginal belief in the sacredness of these animals,
stewardship does not give them any right to control the offensive use of the pictures because no
Aboriginal person participated in the creation of the images nor did the state use traditional knowledge
concerning the species involved. Id. at 1102. Not surprisingly, we do not quarrel with this conclusion.
Nearly everyone would find it shocking if only Aboriginal people or their representative authorities
could depict kangaroos or emus. The implication, however, that some sort of group right should be
recognized where an Aboriginal person did participate in the design or the state made use of otherwise
publicly available traditional knowledge is troubling.
26
Id. at 1067.
27
Id. at 1080.
28
Id. at 1083.
29
Id. at 1083–87.
30
See, e.g., id. at 1084, 1085, 1086, 1087.
31
See, e.g., id. at 1086, 1087.
32
Id. at 1085.
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rights of “representation and attribution” with respect to commercial use of
indigenous religious practices and identities.33 Professors Carpenter et al.
concede that indigenous rights like attribution and commodification should
not always win over the claims of a legitimate creator with respect to
intellectual property.34 They do claim, however, that stewardship is “a
uniquely powerful normative framework” for considering the claims of
indigenous people to intangible property.35 They do not seek, for example,
to deny outsider access to traditional medical information but rather seek to
play a role in the development and distribution of products developed from
such information and to receive compensation for revealing it. They claim
that this type of information is “commonly” associated with sacred or
confidential indigenous information,36 but they do not say that the
stewardship model would be restricted to sacred or confidential
information. Confidential information, at least, does stand on different
ground from information that may be learned simply from observing open
practices of the group or has already been disclosed, without coercion,
outside the group.37 It is quite a different problem, however, if the objection
is that outsiders are making an allegedly profane or otherwise objectionable
use of known but “sacred” information. And while the notion of
“stewardship” can be sufficiently broad to cover the protection of
confidential information that has been improperly released, it is very
difficult to see how “stewardship” applies to nonconfidential information.
Finally, while one can understand the desire to share in the market benefits
from worldwide distribution of a pharmaceutical product based on some
aspect of indigenous but nonconfidential medical knowledge, it is difficult
to see what “stewardship” adds to the claim.
To fill this gap, Professors Carpenter et al. make a second
questionable move. They correctly note that indigenous people are among
the developing world’s poorest. Traditional medical knowledge and genetic
resources may be the economically most important contribution that a
given group can make to the world’s economy. Therefore, “indigenous
peoples increasingly request to share in the profits from the products that
are created through the use of indigenous traditional knowledge, primarily
as a matter of survival and basic equality.”38 This ties in with their earlier
definition of cultural property as property deserving of protection because
33
34
35
36
37
38
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it is integral to indigenous group survival and identity.39 But the move is
problematic. If participation in the commercialization of a downstream
product based on indigenous knowledge is necessary to the group’s
survival, it is not stewardship of the knowledge itself that permits the group
survival but simply the assumed economic claim against knowledge that, in
any other context, would be in the public domain. With only a slight
extension of this reasoning, we could help the group to survive by granting
it a right to share in the exploitation of the works of Shakespeare.
Moreover, this reasoning would not apply to commercial products derived
from indigenous knowledge where the indigenous group is independently
well off economically, say, by reason of mineral resources on their land or
perhaps the operation of gaming casinos. It is insufficient simply to say that
the descendants of knowledge creators are poor so we should give them
permanent exclusive rights to commercialize such knowledge. Were there
any living descendants from Shakespeare, for all we know they might be
poor, too. Fifth generation descendants of Jane Austen’s brothers have been
heard to complain about their inability to share in the commercial benefits
from the recent spate of Austen adaptations into television and film.40 And
even if indigenous groups were to share in the commercialization of
traditional medicinal knowledge, how can we know that the group will in
fact use this survival benefit to preserve their culture, as opposed to simply
joining the mainstream of U.S. society? Finally, Professors Carpenter et al.
do not provide even a conceptual schematic for what kinds of
commercializable knowledge would be subject to stewardship restrictions
or profit sharing41 or for how profits from commercialization are to be
calculated and divided.42 In short, if we are to take information out of the
public domain by giving even “stewardship” rights of participation in its
commercial development, we need a reason other than “the group is poor
39

Id. at 1046; see supra text accompanying note 25.
Amy Stevens, Poor Jane Austen Didn’t Live to See “Sense and Sensibility,” WALL ST. J., March
25, 1996, summarized at http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/opposingcopyrightextension
/commentary/austen-wsj.html, including a response by Dennis Karjala to the nephews’ claims for profit
sharing.
41
In what sense, for example, would the use of a plant to treat a given medical condition be
“integral” to the identity or survival of the group that discovers the useful property?
42
Because the stewardship model supplements rather than replaces traditional property concepts,
Professors Carpenter et al. concede “the need for regulatory oversight or mediation when title-holders
and nonowners disagree.” Id. at 1080. However, what standards does the mediator or regulator apply in
deciding these and the many subsidiary questions that they raise? In the case of pharmaceuticals, in
particular, what part of the risk of unsuccessful commercialization should be borne by the group
supplying the initial information? See Dennis S. Karjala, Sustainability and Intellectual Property Rights
in Traditional Knowledge, 53 JURIMETRICS J. 57, 64 n.25 (2012) (noting that drug companies can invest
hundreds of millions of dollars before having to abandon development efforts because of things like
later-discovered side effects).
40
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and this is their only potential source of subsistence.” This is not to belittle
the problem of poverty among indigenous people, or anybody else. It is,
rather, to say that the problem of poverty is much more important than, and
cannot be meaningfully addressed through, ad hoc recognition of
intellectual property rights in what is otherwise public domain information.
The main intangible-property application that Professors Carpenter et
al. make of their theory is to trademarks. They thereby side-step the
difficult problem of how to apply copyright or copyright-like protection to
indigenous cultural works of art, music, and literature, as well as the
problem of applying patent or patent-like protection to indigenous
information related to technology, such as herbal medicines or human or
other genetic makeup. As discussed above,43 including trademark law under
the rubric of “intellectual property” and then expanding conclusions from
trademark analysis to patent and copyright is an unjustifiable leap. The
indefinite period of trademark exclusivity is ameliorated by the extremely
narrow scope of traditional trademark protection (using the mark falsely to
signal the identity of the supplier of goods or services, and only then if
consumers are confused) that essentially does not impinge on the public
domain.
The intangible cultural property problem to which Professors
Carpenter et al. choose to apply their theory of stewardship is the use of
American Indian imagery and caricatures as sports mascots.44 We may
assume the correctness of their assertions about Native American feelings
toward these symbols:
For some [Native peoples], the mascots deny the truth about Indians: that they
are active participants in dynamic and contemporary cultures that are defined
by unique tribal identities, diverse across the continent. In this view, the
monolithic, “mythic” Indian identity is linked to a colonizer’s attempts to
make Indians disappear, facilitated by a legacy of death, removal, and
assimilation. These Native peoples contend that Indian mascots portray
Indians as nostalgic and anachronistic symbols of the past, and that their
continued use is a manifestation of the vast power disparity faced by Indians
today vis-à-vis whites and other minority groups. For critics of Indian
mascots, no matter how vociferously fans contend that Indian mascots are
meant to “honor” Native people, the actual caricatures and logos – which draw
on stereotypes and employ sacred cultural elements such as feathers, war
paint, songs, and drums – are an abomination.45
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Nevertheless, this example is particularly inapt as an application of the
stewardship principle to the limitation of an intangible property right. This
is not simply because of the questionable nature of trademark rights as
intellectual property.46 Even as an intellectual property right, it is standard
intellectual property dogma that the exclusive rights are negative, that is,
they give the legal power to prevent others from using the work but do not
give an affirmative right to use it in any and all circumstances.47 Moreover,
as Professor Brown has pointed out in a critical analysis of the Carpenter et
al. proposal, most of the offensive and stereotypical uses of Indian imagery
and references are not specific to a given tribe.48 Professors Carpenter et al.
argue at length that the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s policy
prohibiting the use of Native American imagery as sports mascots absent
consent from the relevant Indian tribe created a “cognizable property
interest”49 in the Indian nations.50 We can accept their conclusion that a few
tribes received under this NCAA policy a practical right to participate in
the decision whether to continue to use certain imagery as sports mascots
by certain universities.51 But what is the property right involved in the use
of generic Indian terms like “braves” or “warriors”? And who has the
stewardship right to participate in the decision to allow continued use of
such terms? The problem with sports mascots is that they reinforce

46

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Alexander B. Pope, A Second Look at First Sale: An International Look at U.S.
Copyright Exhaustion, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 201, 205 (2011) (“Intellectual property rights, particularly
copyrights, provide their holders with a number of negative rights, which allow one to prevent others
from taking specific actions”). In Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852,
858 (5th Cir. 1979), the court concluded that obscenity was not a bar to copyright protection. The
copyright would thus give its owner the right to prevent third parties from, say, publicly performing the
work. It would not, however, give the copyright owner the affirmative right to authorize performance of
the work in a locality in which such performance would violate the obscenity laws. Similarly, a patent
in a pharmaceutical gives its owner the right to prevent third parties from making, using, or selling
drugs embodying the patented invention, but the patent owner has no affirmative right to market the
drug without regulatory approvals that are quite independent of the patent law. Trademark rights are not
even phrased in the language of exclusivity. For example, the basic infringement provision states, “Any
person who shall, without the consent of the registrant [use a mark in commerce, etc.] shall be
liable. . . .” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1). Trademark, too, is thus a negative right that creates liability in third
parties who makes use of a mark in violation of the statute, but it does not purport to grant an
affirmative right to the mark owner to use the mark in any way such owner chooses. A mark owner
cannot, for example, use the mark in such a way as to deceive consumers, such as reverse passing off.
See, e.g., Waldman Pub. Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 780 (2nd Cir. 1994).
48
Michael F. Brown, Culture, Property, And Peoplehood: A Comment on Carpenter, Katyal, and
Riley’s “In Defense of Property,” 17 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 569, 571 (2010).
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Carpenter et al., supra note 8 at 1111.
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Id. at 1105–12.
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For example, the University of Utah, after negotiations, received permission from the Ute tribe to
continue to use the name “Utah Utes,” Id. at 1106.
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offensive and stereotypical images of Indians in the general population.52
That is a problem that can be addressed more coherently without the added
complication of supposed property rights further limited by supposed
stewardship rights.
Professors Carpenter et al. assert that, “It is its unique flexibility and
capacity for giving voice to claims of both owners and nonowners that
make stewardship a uniquely powerful normative framework for
considering indigenous peoples’ intangible property claims.”53 However,
they never explain exactly what this “normative framework” actually is,
and they concede that the complexity of intellectual property law will
require variances in indigenous approaches to disputes relating to
intangible property.54 We commend them for avoiding the “one size fits all”
trap for all intangibles related to indigenous cultural heritage, but we query
whether they have moved the ball very far forward in applying their
stewardship notion to intangible cultural property. In each case or set of
circumstances in which indigenous people demand an exception to the
default rule that anyone may freely use information lawfully obtained, we
need to articulate reasons for making such an exception. Only then can we
tailor the type and scope of protection to the circumstances at hand. As
Professors Carpenter et al. point out, the alleged misuse of human genetic
material will raise very different issues from the adoption or modification
into popular music of sacred indigenous music.55
In response to Professor Michael Brown’s critical analysis of their
stewardship proposal,56 Professors Carpenter et al. offer the following
example of what they view as a “cultural property story” based on the
wildly successful Twilight vampire novels by Stephenie Meyer:
[T]he Twilight series depicts young, male members of the [Quileute] tribe as
vampire-fighting
werewolves. . . .
Since
Twilight’s
unprecedented
international success, the Quileute have been overwhelmed with fans and
entrepreneurs, all grasping, quite literally in some cases, for their own piece of
the Quileute.
Dozens of tourists have followed in [Meyer’s] path and removed rocks from
First Beach for their own collections. MSN.com even entered a reservation
cemetery to film the graves of deceased tribal elders, later publishing a
macabre video montage set to music on the Internet. Busloads of tourists roll
52
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Id. at 1100–01.
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Michael F. Brown, supra note 47.

16

15:1 (2017)

The Case Against Property Rights in Old Intangible Indigenous Cultural Property

through the reservation daily, throwing the spotlight on a tribe that never
sought the attention.
With the recent release of the third Twilight movie in the series, the
commercialization of all things Quileute—from movies and books, to charm
bracelets and earrings – has spawned a multimillion-dollar empire. Yet, little
of this benefits the Quileute people, who remain impoverished and are
currently devoting most of their scarce resources to a fight with the U.S.
government over their ancestral lands. At the same time, copyright, trademark,
and other laws protect those who have commodified Quileute culture—giving
everyone from Stephenie Meyer, Summit Entertainment, and a dozen online
T-shirt sellers the legal “right” to profit from so-called Quileute creations.
This is, in our view, a cultural property story. For the Quileute, as for most
indigenous peoples in the world, culture is tied to their lands, resources,
language, religion, sovereignty, and the Seventh Generation. Since the arrival
of Europeans in North America, the Quileute have suffered severe losses of all
of these resources, with the Twilight phenomenon representing only the most
contemporary incarnation. Yet, like other indigenous peoples, the Quileute are
not content to sit back while others commodify their cultural heritage. Instead,
they are using legal tools to protect their cultural resources and navigate their
participation in contemporary commerce.57

There are indeed many potential wrongs in this cultural property story.
The removal of rocks and similar items as souvenirs is something that can
be controlled by ordinary trespass and conversion rules. Cemetery
desecration or disrespect can also be regulated by property law, perhaps
even with some stewardship limitations depending on who owns title to the
property in question. It takes little imagination, moreover, to understand the
tribe’s offense at being portrayed as werewolves. Here, however, we have
difficulty understanding how creation or modification of property rights,
especially rights in intangibles, can meaningfully address the problem.
Falsely labeling an item as “Indian” or “Quileute” is actionable in the
United States,58 and if this type of protection needs strengthening, we have
no objection to listening to suggestions. Indeed, to the extent that many
more people now know the name “Quileute” and actively seek artifacts
associated with that name, the Twilight series may have given the artisans
of that community an opportunity to profit, should they so choose, to sell
into a much larger market than had existed previously.
57

Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, Clarifying Cultural Property 17 INT’L
J. CULTURAL PROP. 581 (2010). They go on to describe some success in getting MSN to apologize and
take down the graveyard video. Subsequent documentary crews have negotiated permission to film on
the reservation, and a website was created aimed at delineating authentic Quileute-made items from
those made by outsiders. Id.
58
Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. § 305 et seq. & 18 U.S.C. §§ 1158–59 (2012).
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The main complaint in this “cultural property story,” therefore, seems
to be that the Quileute have not shared in the profits from the
“multimillion-dollar empire” that the Meyer novels have spawned.59 If this
is true, our question is, what is the basis – legal or moral – on which such a
claim to profit sharing can be based? Would a similar basis give profitsharing rights to the “victims” of Edgar Lee Masters’s thinly veiled
descriptions of people from his hometown in the Spoon River Anthology or
those on whom Grace Metalious based characters for Peyton Place? Every
work is based on known or assumed cultural surroundings of some sort. A
primary reason we have a public domain for most information concerning
such surroundings is to avoid the need to apportion the relative merits of
contributions to identifiable works, like literature, art, and music, that are
created in reliance on these cultural backgrounds.
B. Other Suggested Approaches
With no claim to comprehensiveness, we address here briefly the
contributions of some recent commentators to illustrate what we regard as
the structural framework for analyzing the problem of protecting intangible
indigenous cultural heritage. Yuqin Jin60 argues for U.S. adoption of
“indigenous IP laws” respecting biological and genetic knowledge but is
unclear exactly what those laws should provide. Jin argues for a
registration system for indigenous knowledge and mandatory disclosure of

59

The literature is replete with stories of this type. For example, Professor Riley relates how a song
from an indigenous Taiwanese group was recorded without permission during a European tour by an
elder who had been entrusted to act as “keeper” of the group’s traditional folk songs. The artist Enigma
purchased rights to the recording from the French Cultural Ministry and ended up with a worldwide hit.
Professor Riley laments the group’s inability to “control resulting violations of tribal law and blatant
distortions of their work.” Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Promise of Globalization: An
Essay on Rights and Responsibilities, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 155, 158 (2004). But what, exactly, is
the complaint here? If it is the surreptitious recording, we can place the wrong easily within the wide
range of western legal rules that seek to regulate and prohibit deception. Indeed, such surreptitious
recording of a musical performance would subject the recorder to the remedies for copyright
infringement in the United States. 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012). If the recording was sampled without the
performer’s permission, there might be an infringement of the sound recording copyright. If the harm,
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essence of the complaint is that someone outside the group has made money based on cultural traditions
emanating from the group. Pete Seeger did essentially the same thing with the African song
“Wimoweh.” Picasso took from African art, and Van Gogh took from Japanese art. That is how culture
worldwide grows and, indeed, thrives.
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Jin, supra note 6.
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the origins of genetic resources in patent applications.61 While these
provisions might prevent the issuance of some patents and invalidate
others, they would not in themselves give any affirmative right of control
over the knowledge in question or any economic compensation to the
indigenous group that is the source of the knowledge. Jin also suggests that
“indigenous medicine, fauna, flora, and their associated knowledge” should
be eligible for patents, perhaps for a longer term than is provided for
inventions generally.62 Jin acknowledges the problems of what peoples
qualify as “indigenous” and who speaks for them.63 However, while this
contribution does not explicitly advocate a “one size fits all” solution to the
question of indigenous IP, it does not explain how the rights it advocates
might vary from group to group. Nor does it attempt to address the problem
of why indigenous knowledge, and only indigenous knowledge, should get
treatment so radically different under IP law than we afford to all other
types of old knowledge. Indeed, in a closing argument Jin asserts that if
indigenous people could have patented turmeric, the subsequent litigation
ultimately denying such a patent to “inventors” outside turmeric’s
indigenous discoverers could have been avoided.64 The real lesson,
however, is that patents in old knowledge should not be afforded to
anybody, indigenous or otherwise.
Don Marahare has reviewed the oft-cited “deficiencies” of traditional
intellectual property law in the protection of traditional knowledge, such as
the absence of protection for old knowledge or where no definitive author
can be identified.65 He strongly supports the Model Law for the Protection
of Traditional Knowledge and Expressions of Culture, discussed critically
below,66 supplemented by ideas from such things as the Convention on
Biological Diversity.67 We do not review his specific suggestions, because
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Id. at 974–75.
Id. at 975–76.
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Id. at 958.
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Id. at 976. Assuming turmeric was in “public use” somewhere, no patent in it could validly issue
in that country or elsewhere. Moreover, even if a patent did validly issue in another country – for
example, in the United States, whose former statute required use “in this country” to disqualify an
applicant – that would have no effect on continued indigenous use by the people whose ancestors made
the discovery, because there can be no valid patent there. Preventing outsiders from obtaining a patent
may give some visceral satisfaction, but it brings no monetary compensation to the indigenous group or
anyone else.
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Don Marahare, Towards an Equitable Future in Vanuatu: The Legal Protection of Cultural
Property, 8 J. SOUTH PAC. L. (2004), http://www.paclii.org/journals/fJSPL/vol08no2/6.shtml
[https://perma.cc/D6DJ-RUA8].
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See infra notes 102–08 and accompanying text.
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we feel that Mr. Marahare begins from an incorrect premise, namely, that
the goal is to achieve “maximum protection over . . . traditional
knowledge.”68 Protection of knowledge is only half of the IP equation.
Protection does provide some benefits to some people, but protection is
also socially detrimental in tying up knowledge that could otherwise be
used freely to advance both culture and technology. A move toward more
protection is not warranted unless it can be shown that the benefits
outweigh the costs.
Molly Torsen recognizes the inadequacy of a one-size-fits-all
approach to the protection of traditional cultural expression and argues that
general principles of western law can be applied to accommodate the needs
of traditional cultures.69 Her main concern appears to be indigenous control
of distortion, disrespect, or commodification of traditional cultural
expression,70 and she finds basic philosophical principles in otherwise
apparently disparate bodies of law such as the protection of geographical
indications,71 moral rights and copyright,72 and privacy law,73 as well as
various international instruments.74 She also recognizes the need to balance
indigenous claims against principles of free speech.75 Rather than a new
body of law, she seeks a “declaration” that “traditional cultural expressions
shall be extended an understanding of protection against usage,
dissemination, and the making of derivative works deemed inappropriate
by the collective people by whom the TCE was created.”76 She concedes
ambiguity in determining what is “inappropriate” and does not supply a
means for determining who the “collective people” are or who speaks for
them. Presumably, after such a declaration is adopted, courts in the
adopting countries would decide disputes on a case-by-case common law
approach. While we perhaps lack Ms. Torsen’s confidence that such a
declaration would actually be effective in achieving her respect and antidistortion goals, we see no objection to giving it a try. It is a serious attempt
to avoid the difficulties of a one-size-fits-all approach – especially an
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approach that relies on intellectual property rights in old knowledge – and
to accommodate not only the interests of the indigenous people involved in
a particular case but also the more general society’s interest in free speech
and the further development of culture based on the existing cultural
heritage.
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has been
seeking for a number of years to come up with a proposal for protecting
traditional knowledge (TK), traditional cultural expressions (TCE), and
genetic resources.77 As of October 2013, developed and developing
countries were still wrangling over the protection of folklore and TCEs.
Even putting substantive issues of protection to the side, the parties had not
yet agreed even as to the form of the instrument – binding treaty,
nonbinding agreement, or some third approach.78 We strongly recommend
that the WIPO negotiators avoid the trap of defining specific classes of
“traditional knowledge” or “traditional cultural expressions” and
attempting to attach new forms of IPRs to them. Starting from a welldefined problem (such as profane use of sacred imagery) and working up to
a narrowly tailored solution is the only way to avoid a clash with
fundamental notions of free speech and cultural advance.
C. The New Zealand Wai 262 Report
In 2011 an important report concerning the cultural rights of New
Zealand’s indigenous Maori people was published. With no written
constitution, New Zealand law furnishes only statutory and common law
rights for its large Maori population. Nevertheless, the Waitangi Tribunal
report in Ko Aotearoa Tenei: A Report into Claims Concerning New
Zealand Law and Policy Affecting Maori Culture and Identity (the “Wai
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Knowledge and Folklore was established by the World Intellectual Property Organization in 2000.
WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK 62 (2d ed. 2004), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en
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Daniel Pruzin, WIPO Members Endorse Plans for Talks on Genetic Resources, Traditional
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262 report”) is likely to significantly influence future legal developments in
New Zealand, as well as attract interest from around the world.79
The Wai 262 report was in response to a claim originally filed in 1991
by six Maori tribes (iwi) regarding flora, fauna, and intellectual property
issues.80 It is beyond the scope of this analysis to discuss the report in detail
but certain aspects of the report that address issues surrounding the legal
protection of traditional Maori knowledge and culture are relevant to our
topic. The Wai 262 report may represent an example of the stewardship
notion that Carpenter et al. have put forth.
The Wai 262 report focused on the concept of Maori stewardship or
guardianship (kaitiakitanga) – a concept of caring for natural and physical
resources for the overall benefit of peoples and the resources themselves.
The object of the report was to address Maori claims that the New Zealand
government (the Crown) had failed to adequately protect, preserve, and
respect various aspects of Maori culture and traditional knowledge. This
meant addressing the ongoing tension between indigenous rights and
existing intellectual property laws. The tribunal itself recognized this by
referring to the two different (English and Maori language) versions of the
1840 Treaty of Waitangi (between the British Crown and the Maori tribes),
which forms the basis for the jurisdiction of the Waitangi tribunal over
claims like Wai 262.81 The Wai 262 report centered on the language of
Article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi. The Maori version of Article 2
emphasizes traditional knowledge, whereas the English version affirms
western concepts of property, with its use of such terms as “preemption”
and “alienation”. Nevertheless, inherent in the fact that the two different
versions of the treaty are of equal authority is the idea that Maori were
ceding sovereignty to the (then British) Crown, in exchange for retaining
possession of their own lands and other resources.82 Even if the tribunal
finds that the Crown has breached its duty towards Maori based on the
treaty, this does not necessarily mean such breaches are remediable under
New Zealand law. However, the the tribunal’s identification of violations
79
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by the Crown of treaty provisions often leads to the New Zealand
government’s introducing changes in legislation, policies, and practices
affecting Maori.
The Wai 262 report addressed the concept of the public domain by
noting that while Maori possession of its traditional knowledge was, prior
to European settlement, undisturbed, it is now a shared resource, and, in
that sense, irretrievable. While this may seem self-evident, it was an
important conclusion, since it implicitly rejected the idea of creating sui
generis intellectual property rights for Maori traditional knowledge.83
Instead, the tribunal’s report focused on the stewardship principle, which it
saw as itself a key component of Maori culture. In so doing the report also
sided with the vast majority of contemporary legal scholarship which
concludes that indigenous traditional knowledge is an ill fit with western
intellectual property concepts.
The tribunal thought that there needed to be restrictions in place to
prevent the offensive or derogatory public use of Maori forms of cultural
expression.84 While New Zealand law already protects against such use to a
certain extent, the tribunal recommended enhanced protection where
someone had an existing custodial or guardianship relationship (kaitiaki) to
the objects and beliefs in question. The report proposes that the existing
Maori Trade Marks Advisory Committee be replaced by a new
Commission that would establish guidelines for prospective users of Maori
cultural expressions. This Commission could also serve as a register of the
guardians of particular works, but such registration would not be made
compulsory. The idea of a prohibition on offensive or derogatory use of
Maori works seems appropriate enough and has well-established
precedents in other countries with significant indigenous populations –
such as Canada and the United States. What is more problematic about the
tribunal’s proposals is what exactly it is that can be subject to a
“guardianship” relationship and afforded legal protection on that basis.
Since these relationships appear to be subject to definition on a case-bycase basis, it would seem that there could be a good deal of uncertainty as
to when a given use is protected, along with the precise nature of the level
of protection itself.
The most controversial aspect of the report’s recommendations
surrounds its suggestion that any commercial use of Maori culture that is
the subject of a “guardianship” relationship requires consultation with and
83
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possibly consent from kaitiaki before use. It should be stressed, however,
that this recommendation is based on the tribunal’s understanding of the
obligations of the New Zealand Crown under the Treaty of Waitangi. As
explained in the report, while western-based intellectual property concepts
define specific legal rights connected to certain forms of property, Maori
focus on relationships towards their cultural objects (taonga) and the duties
and responsibilities that surround these relationships. The recommendation
that consent be required to allow the commercial use of Maori cultural
objects is basically a suggestion that New Zealand law make such consent
mandatory – whether or not the works concerned are in the public domain.
It remains unclear how such a requirement would be implemented and what
sort of recognition it would receive outside New Zealand.
Even if this requirement of consent for expressions of Maori
traditional knowledge were made part of New Zealand law, it is not clear
what it exactly entails. The report does not explain what would happen if
consent were refused – even assuming there had been prior consultation.
Furthermore, the report recommends that the Commission have the power
to limit commercial use of Maori cultural expressions in a form that the
would-be user already has intellectual property rights over – like a
photograph. Would this mean, for example, that the owner of copyright in a
photograph could not display it for sale in a gallery if the kaitiaki of its
subject matter objected?
The report grapples with this problem by suggesting that while
existing intellectual property rights cannot be compromised, any future
rights would be subject to decisions of the Commission. Thus, a design
might be refused registration under the existing statutory scheme if the
Commission decided that there had been inadequate consultation or an
absence of consent. In effect, existing intellectual property rights might be
made subject to laws giving effect to Treaty of Waitangi principles. This,
however, would take the regulation beyond commercial uses of the subject
matter. Indeed, refusal to recognize intellectual property rights would not
address the basis for a stewardship rejection of commercial exploitation,
which must inhere in the offensiveness of such exploitation. That a work is
not protected by, say, copyright does not mean it cannot be published or
sold. It only means that its creator has no exclusive rights to such
publication or sale.
The report distinguished between what it described as “taonga-works”
(Maori treasures or highly prized possessions) and “taonga-derived works”.
While the former are assumed to always have living individuals or
communities that are responsible for them, the latter are works that have a
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Maori element but this is in combination with other non-Maori influences.85
For these, there is no kaitiaki relationship. The report suggests that while
derivative works be made subject to restrictions on offensive or derogatory
use, they not be subject to consultation or consent because of the absence
of guardians. In her analysis of the report, Dr. Jessica Christine Lai has
said:
It would seem to the author here that the distinction cannot be made
objectively and that the line between the two seems conceptually porous. As
has been stated elsewhere, the opinion of Maori is by no means lacking in
diversity, making it difficult to objectively and consistently answer the
question of how much Western or “modern” material must make up a work
for it to no longer be considered a taonga work but a taonga-derived work.
Considering that Maori culture should be viewed as dynamic and constantly
developing, how does one differentiate between this acceptable development
(which may involve incorporating in aspects not of traditional Maori culture)
and hybrids that cross the line and become taonga-derived works? This further
begs the question of whether the racial descent of the creator is important
towards this end. In other words, is one more willing to consider something a
taonga work, rather than a taonga-derived work, if its creator is Maori in
descent? If so, is that a justifiable distinction to make? Notably, this would not
go both ways, as non-Maori can only make taonga-derived works, due to the
requirement of a kaitiaki relationship.86

Given the significance of the consultation and consent requirement, it
is surprising that the report did not address these inherent problems more
closely. In effect, the report is dealing here with the concept of “fair use” or
its equivalent, which in most legal systems is seen as ensuring a basis for
new interpretations and other creative expressions. If the concept of
“taonga-derived works” were interpreted narrowly, it would place a
significant and undesirable restriction on such creativity. This example
illustrates the need to articulate the basis for limiting the right to use
information freely. The justification for any right of refusal must inhere in a
notion of sacrilege or similar offensive use of the underlying work.
Assuming we can actually identify what is “offensive” and quantify how
much “offensiveness” must be present to justify a refusal to allow
commercial exploitation – each an extraordinarily difficult problem in a
society that believes in rights of free expression – any refusal should be
predicated not on the quantity of underlying indigenous content that finds
its way into the challenged work but on the aspects of the challenged work
85
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that make the work offensive. It should be clear that a desire to share in the
profits to be derived from the proposed commercial exploitation should not
be a factor in justifying a refusal to allow commercial exploitation.
Another controversial aspect of the report is its suggestion that certain
Maori traditional knowledge (matauranga Maori) that is “closely-held” be
afforded additional protection beyond merely a prohibition on offensive or
derogatory use. This is the closest the report gets to addressing what level
of legal protection could be afforded intangible Maori culture. While
unable to define the content of such Maori culture, the tribunal thought that
traditional knowledge that was specific to particular Maori communities
should enjoy some level of protection – possibly against offensive or
derogatory use, as well as requirements of consultation and consent. As
with Maori works more generally, there are troubling questions here
surrounding how and when such use should or could be controlled. In
addition, as Dr. Lai has pointed out, there is a good deal of uncertainty as to
what exactly “closely-held” means.87 She ponders from whose perspective
such intangible cultural heritage would be considered as “closely-held.” As
she goes on to say, the report also fails to address the possible misuse by
Maori themselves of Maori culture. The report discusses the rights of
Maori versus non-Maori, but it does not explain how its recommendations
apply in other contexts – such as Maori misuse of Maori culture.88 Again,
articulation of the reasons justifying any deviation from the default rule that
information should be freely useable by anyone is necessary both in
determining the existence and scope of the right and the basis, if any, for
distinguishing between Maori and non-Maori use of the knowledge.
Some aspects of the tribunal’s report do speak to general issues
concerning the basis for affording legal protection to indigenous cultural
heritage. What is most striking about the report is that it completely avoids
any suggestion that new forms of property rights be created in respect of
Maori cultural heritage. The explanations for this are likely many, but the
most likely must be the daunting task of defining the content of such rights
and explaining how they would co-exist with pre-existing norms. New
Zealand has struggled over the last few decades to resolve its identity
through a new kind of engagement between its Maori and non-Maori
(pakeha) populations. The Wai 262 report is just one facet of this tortuous
journey. It would seem its authors chose “stewardship” together with all its
attendant uncertainties, over ownership, with the aim of avoiding the sort of
confrontation that a rights-based approach might have engendered. In so
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doing they may have merely designed a roadmap with its own particular set
of problems concerning implementation and dissonance.
D. Taiwan
In 2007, Taiwan enacted the Act for the Protection of the Traditional
Intellectual Creations of Indigenous Peoples (“the Act”).89 While it has
received relatively scant attention outside Taiwan, the Act represents a
significant example of emerging efforts to provide additional protection for
the traditional cultures of indigenous peoples.90 Unfortunately, the Taiwan
statute is more an example of what should not be done for the protection of
indigenous cultural heritage than what should be done.
Article 1 of the Act states a purpose to protect the “traditional
intellectual creations” of Taiwan’s indigenous peoples, as well as to
promote the overall development of Taiwan’s indigenous culture. Article 3
of the Act defines the scope of the “intellectual creations” the law is
designed to protect in terms of their being expressed in such forms as
ceremonies, songs, weaving, and clothing. This means that the ideas on
which such manifestations are based are not protected by the Act.
However, it is unclear whether the word “creations” limits the protection
the Act affords to cultural expressions that are in some way novel, rather
than mere repetitions of traditional concepts.91 What is clear is that the Act
is about cultural “expressions” rather than indigenous ecological traditional
knowledge which is to be the subject of a separate law.92
To receive the protection of the Act, “traditional intellectual creations”
are required to be registered pursuant to a government-run system set up
under the Act.93 A group, including experts, scholars and indigenous
representatives will vet applications under the Act. The rights that
registration confers are limited to aboriginal groups or tribes, and
representatives are to be elected to represent the appropriate body.
Exclusive rights can be awarded to a group or tribe, or several tribes and
groups jointly, but if no group or tribe can be determined to own the
89
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“intellectual creation” rights in it shall be registered in the name of the
indigenous peoples of Taiwan as a whole. 94
The legal nature of the rights protected under the Act are set out in
Articles 11, 12 and 13. The exclusive right to exploit an “intellectual
creation” is defined as comprising “the property and moral rights of the
intellectual creations.” Moral rights are defined as including the right to
release the work, to identify an exclusive user and the right to prevent
distortion, mutilation or modification of the work in a manner that violates
the author’s reputation.95 Rights are inalienable and non-transferable, and, if
abandoned (or if a tribe or group ceases to exist), automatically revert to
the aboriginal peoples of Taiwan.96 Proceeds (such as royalties) derived by
a tribe or group from rights cannot be used by individual persons for their
own benefit but are to become part of an indigenous peoples welfare fund.97
The Act eschews protection through the registration of names or
marks in favor of property rights over certain manifestations of indigenous
culture, which are rights to be held, apparently in perpetuity, by indigenous
groups. As Professor Yang has pointed out, many traditional cultural
expressions are regarded as sacred, and turning them into property rights
may be seen by many as inappropriate. This relates to the recurrent
problem of being able to define ownership when the origins of the
traditional knowledge may itself be unclear.98 Of much greater importance,
however, is the fundamental problem of giving property rights in old
information – and most especially perpetual property rights in old
information. In terms of the policy analysis outlined above, the question
must always be why new IPRs are being recognized.99 What problem,
exactly, is solved by recognizing property rights in old information? What
is lacking in this statute is a normative basis for the level of protection it
affords. Why does Taiwan protect indigenous cultural heritage differently
from other parts of its cultural heritage? The answer cannot lie solely in
what indigenous people want (assuming that they are unified on the point).
Many western authors today clamor for longer, even perpetual, copyright
rights. The issue is whether the claims have legitimacy in the context of
society as a whole.
The title of the Act has been criticized as suggesting that its subjectmatter consists of all of the traditional intellectual knowledge of Taiwan’s
94
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indigenous peoples, whereas its actual scope is much more limited.100 The
law deliberately omits biological knowledge and is primarily based on the
provisions of earlier Taiwanese intellectual property laws. An even more
serious concern is that the Act fails to adequately address the problem of
deciding who is the appropriate representative for the rights claimed. With
thirteen indigenous groups, there are many possibilities for uncertainty over
which group has the best claim to a particular “intellectual creation.” Many
practices may be shared or no longer practiced. On the other hand,
registration suggests stasis and restraint of the fluid cross-fertilization of
ideas and practices between cultures. The Act may “privilege certain
interpretations of this tradition and render others ‘inauthentic’ and less
‘genuine’.”101 Even worse, where no tribe or group can be identified as the
source, the information remains the restricted property of the aboriginal
people of Taiwan instead of reverting to the public domain. What basis can
there possibly be for such restrictions on the use of cultural information? In
terms of western culture, this is analogous to recognizing a new property
right in the works of Homer in the country of Greece or some subset of its
current population. It goes without saying that the lucky members of any
group entitled to royalties would be pleased with such a new property right
in the works of Homer. But would the world, or even Greece, be better off
if members of that group had sole right of control over new translations and
interpretations of these classic works?
Kai-Shih Lin has suggested that a probable effect of the Act could be
that artists will avoid using Taiwanese cultural expressions as a basis for
new works because of fear of contravening the new law.102 This could mean
that Taiwanese indigenous cultures become isolated and of less interest to
outsiders so that the registration under the Act becomes pointless.
Copyright law is not extraterritorial, which means that no other country is
bound to recognize the rights Taiwan affords to its indigenous groups.
Outsiders would be free to appropriate from these groups at will, so long as
all their underlying source material is obtained legally and all reproduction
and derivative work preparation takes place outside of Taiwan. Taiwanese
authors, however, would be severely hampered in their ability to make use
of their own cultural heritage in the creation of new works. This cannot be
considered a positive development for current authors in Taiwan.
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E. The Pacific Island Countries Regional Framework
The Model Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and
Expressions of Culture derives from a Pacific Regional Framework aimed
at assisting Pacific Island countries that wish to legislate new protection of
traditional knowledge (TK) and expressions of culture (EOCs).103 This
Model Law suffers from the same fundamental errors as the Taiwan statute
discussed above. The Model Law very broadly defines “expressions of
culture” and “traditional knowledge”104 and requires “prior and informed
consent” from the “traditional owners” before performing just about any
“non-customary” act one can imagine doing with traditional knowledge or
expressions of culture other than privately thinking about them.105 The
rights endure in perpetuity.106 The traditional owners, who are the ones
authorized to give permission for non-customary uses, are the indigenous
groups or the individuals recognized by the groups to whom protection is
entrusted according to the customary practices of the groups.107 The Model
Law has a procedure for identifying the traditional owners,108 but if no
traditional owners can be identified, the determining agency (the “Cultural
Authority”) may deem itself the “traditional owner” and must use any
benefits derived “for traditional cultural development purposes.”109 No
justification is offered – indeed, there seems to be no recognition of the
103
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problem – for the economic inefficiency of protecting information in
perpetuity, for protecting information to which no one can claim
ownership, or for inhibiting further cultural development by creative
people, whether inside or outside the group, who base new works on
existing TK or EOCs, no matter how old or how tenuous the “ownership”
claim.
Miranda Forsyth offers a cogent critical analysis of the Pacific Island
Model Law as insufficiently considering the interrelationship between
customary legal institutions, TK, and the indigenous communities TK
protection is intended to serve.110 She points out the problems of intra-group
disputes over allowed uses and economic benefit sharing,111 unrealistic
benefit expectations by group members,112 the need to deal with property
already in the public domain,113 and the stifling of internal use and
development by TK owners themselves.114 Forsyth recommends a “deep
pluralistic approach” to the problem of TK protection that works from the
ground up, beginning with each individual community itself determining
what the local people’s needs and desires actually are in drawing an
appropriate balance between such aims as conservation and
commercialization.115 She argues that the state should be a facilitator, not a
regulator, in helping local communities devise and enforce decisions
concerning TK, such as (presumably) secret or sacred knowledge and
perhaps, as we have suggested, developing systems of certification marks
for different communities.116 A central goal would be a system facilitating
access by local communities to their own TK and to the TK of neighboring
communities.117
We agree with a general approach that looks concretely at specific
problems in the real world rather than one-size-fits-all abstractions. Sacred
and secret information is different from information that has long been
available to, and used by, people inside and outside the group from which
the information first derived. It is only by identifying specific claims to
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specific knowledge and evaluating those claims in the light of a group’s
interest in maintaining a degree of control and society’s interest in the free
flow of information that we can effect the set of compromises that must
underlie any realistic system of TK protection.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON SUI GENERIS APPROACHES
We have suggested approaches to the protection of intangible cultural
heritage outside the framework of IPRs, such as through tort law, contract
law, rights of privacy, and analogies to trademark and trade secret law.118
We will not reiterate that discussion here. Rather, we wish to reaffirm the
need to articulate specific legitimate interests that some indigenous people
or groups may have in certain information or classes of information. Sacred
information relating to religious rites that is not generally known provides
one of the clearest examples. To the extent such information exists, and the
groups in question wish to maintain its secrecy, we can imagine a statutory
solution modeled on privacy and trade secret protection that could serve the
legitimate interests of the group. On the other hand, where the information
is publicly known and not otherwise eligible for protection under the
existing IPR regimes, it is difficult for us to see any case for general control
rights in the group that was the original source of the information. Between
these two extremes, arguments can and should be made on a case-by-case
basis, with focus always on the harm that is being suffered from outsider
use of the information in question and whether that harm justifies
limitations on free speech and the dissemination of knowledge.
We recognize that, at bottom, we are choosing sides in a fundamental
value conflict. The default position of most western societies is that
publicly available information, being nonrival, is free for all to use, subject
to the IPR regimes for new information and subject to specific uses of
information that threaten identifiable harms (e.g., crying “Fire!” in a
crowded theater, even if there is an actual fire). Many defenders of
exclusive rights in intangible indigenous cultural property disagree that this
default position should apply to indigenous groups. The reasons these
defenders have thus far given for their position, however, are not
convincing. That many wrongs have been perpetrated against many
indigenous groups all over the world, often over the course of centuries, is
undeniable. How to compensate for these wrongs to the extent possible is a
vital subject of public discourse and potential legal development.
Recognizing exclusive control rights, or even more limited “stewardship”
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rights, in old information, however, is simply not a remedy that in any way,
except by chance, relates to the wrong.
In each case, we need to ask whether a right equivalent to the one
proposed for indigenous groups should be recognized for nonindigenous
groups otherwise similarly situated. Can and should we afford exclusive
control over the origin stories of indigenous groups while denying such
control to the Greeks over Homer? There is a clear and easily articulated
basis for the default position that information is and must be free, with at
least articulated reasons for the exceptions relating to traditional IPRs.
There is nothing in that basis that distinguishes between information
deriving from particular groups, indigenous or otherwise. The burden is
therefore on those seeking stronger indigenous group rights in old
information to articulate clearly whatever basis they see for deviating from
this solidly grounded default position that information is free.
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